6 October 2007
Introduction to the Gamefields Landsafe Investment model...
INTRODUCTION
The Landsafe integrated conservation and development model was designed by Gamefields in order to conserve the biodiversity and ecosystems of land held under customary tenure – which includes protected areas. This is a development mechanism, one ideally suited to Zambia where the traditions of public private partnership (PPP) in wildlife conservation and community development started in 1949, a partnership between a customary authority, investors and NGOs providing the essential structure for rural development of investment, land and community partners, and the expertise to carry out scientifically directed integrated development. As has been noted elsewhere (Clark, 2001) ‘the need is less for new knowledge than for applying what is already known in an experimental, problem-solving mode. More generally, the need is for integrated systems bridging the frequently separate domains of research, monitoring, assessment, and support for operational decision making ‘ This defines, exactly, Landsafe integrated conservation and development.
BACKGROUND
Zambia, despite political stability, rich natural resources and remarkable species and ecological diversity, high rainfall, low population densities in rural areas and minimal impacts on the environment, is undeveloped and attracts little investment. In the 93% of the land held under customary tenure, there is virtually no investment whatsoever, people living much as they have done since the first wave of immigration to the country in the 17th Century, a life of hunter gathering and subsistence agriculture where the benefits of development - health, education, welfare, biodiversity and environmental stability and wealth creation, remain illusive.
The history of formal public private partnerships of an integrated conservation and development nature in the country had their beginning in 1949 when the newly formed Game Department of Northern Rhodesia entered into an agreement with Chief Nsefu whereby he and his people received income from the tourist use of a Game Department tourism camp (N. Carr, 1949). When, in the early fifties the Chief’s area was proclaimed a game reserve, earnings ceased. The Game Department in 1949 also initiated the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme (N.J. Carr, 1949) which conducted safari hunting operations in the Eastern Province with a large percentage of the income accruing to the Native Authority. The scheme ran well into the 1950’s until in 1962 it was privatized, with the local authorities receiving no further direct income until the late 1980s. The next significant scheme was in 1973 with the establishment of the Black Lechwe Project (Grimsdell and Bell, 1975; I.P.A. Manning, 1976) of which Phase three was intended to allow the local people to utilize black lechwe, something never achieved as the scheme was abandoned by Government. In the 1980’s the ADMADE project was established (D. Lewis, 198 ) which sought to derive direct benefits from wildlife for villagers, this aspect being unsuccessful – though their training and capacity supports to communities continues to makes a valuable contribution. Later the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project was mooted, attempting on a far grander scale what ADMADE had attempted. It too proved unsuccessful.
The Zambian leadership (though not the legislation and policy) is ambivalent both in its attempts to devolve power from the centre to the regions – in particular to land under the customary authority, and to attract investment, wary of being swamped by aggressive outsiders whom they believe will capture the opportunities for wealth creation. Zambia therefore resists de-centralization and remains dependent on donor aid which creates few jobs, does not generate sustainable development, perpetuates Zambia’s debt dependency, weakens its ability to fend for itself and hinders it from becoming truly independent.
However, Zambia, under current laws, provides opportunities for investors to enter into joint ventures with customary authorities and district councils. The 1995 Lands Act created the opportunity for individuals with rights of usage and occupation of land under customary law to obtain leasehold rights of 99 years within open areas – and with the permission of ZAWA, in GMAs. This attracted a certain level of investment and one-off payments to Chiefs, particularly from the sale of lodge sites and land for game ranches, resulting in some cases, in the permanent alienation of the land and the removal of any possible sustained income for communities. While posing dangers of land alienation, the Lands Act does support the devolution of power to communities. In addition, there are two important Acts supporting the empowerment of communities, the Wildlife Act of 1998, which prescribes the election of Community Resource Boards (CRBs) with the chief as patron and which advances as one of its main missions: ‘to facilitate the active participation of local communities in the management of the wildlife estate’, and the Forestry Act No. 7 of 1999, which though yet to be enacted is already advancing its de-centralization and community ownership provisions. However, very little investment has found its way into rural areas because the usual purpose of investors is to obtain large areas of land on leasehold, something to which Africa as a whole is united in rejecting. In order to avoid such a pitfall, it is necessary to have a development model available which does not alienate land, and which encourages investment in the sustained use of the natural resources and the improvement in the livelihoods of local communities.
At present, virtually the only income received by customary areas – and then only in wildlife rich areas, is from safari concessions, though the amounts are paltry when considering that communities must shoulder the cost of protecting their areas as part of the bargain. And despite legislation and policy affirming the rights of customary authorities and CRBs, and despite its ratification of international and Pan-African conventions, Government resists moves by chiefdoms and investors to make more holistic use of the hunting concessions - which fall under the authority.
What is required is a shift away from one-dimensional safari hunting concessions, and its replacement in selected areas by a conservancy system of integrated conservation and development programmes that will ensure the continued level of earnings for ZAWA, the capacity support to CRBs, the non-alienation of land from the chiefdoms, enabling chiefdoms and the flagging District Councils to engage with investors and nurture the overdue raising of community livelihoods and, crucially, bring investors a sustained return.
The Landsafe integrated conservation and development model was designed by Gamefields in order to conserve the biodiversity and ecosystems of land held under customary tenure – which includes protected areas. This is a development mechanism, one ideally suited to Zambia where the traditions of public private partnership (PPP) in wildlife conservation and community development started in 1949, a partnership between a customary authority, investors and NGOs providing the essential structure for rural development of investment, land and community partners, and the expertise to carry out scientifically directed integrated development. As has been noted elsewhere (Clark, 2001) ‘the need is less for new knowledge than for applying what is already known in an experimental, problem-solving mode. More generally, the need is for integrated systems bridging the frequently separate domains of research, monitoring, assessment, and support for operational decision making ‘ This defines, exactly, Landsafe integrated conservation and development.
BACKGROUND
Zambia, despite political stability, rich natural resources and remarkable species and ecological diversity, high rainfall, low population densities in rural areas and minimal impacts on the environment, is undeveloped and attracts little investment. In the 93% of the land held under customary tenure, there is virtually no investment whatsoever, people living much as they have done since the first wave of immigration to the country in the 17th Century, a life of hunter gathering and subsistence agriculture where the benefits of development - health, education, welfare, biodiversity and environmental stability and wealth creation, remain illusive.
The history of formal public private partnerships of an integrated conservation and development nature in the country had their beginning in 1949 when the newly formed Game Department of Northern Rhodesia entered into an agreement with Chief Nsefu whereby he and his people received income from the tourist use of a Game Department tourism camp (N. Carr, 1949). When, in the early fifties the Chief’s area was proclaimed a game reserve, earnings ceased. The Game Department in 1949 also initiated the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme (N.J. Carr, 1949) which conducted safari hunting operations in the Eastern Province with a large percentage of the income accruing to the Native Authority. The scheme ran well into the 1950’s until in 1962 it was privatized, with the local authorities receiving no further direct income until the late 1980s. The next significant scheme was in 1973 with the establishment of the Black Lechwe Project (Grimsdell and Bell, 1975; I.P.A. Manning, 1976) of which Phase three was intended to allow the local people to utilize black lechwe, something never achieved as the scheme was abandoned by Government. In the 1980’s the ADMADE project was established (D. Lewis, 198 ) which sought to derive direct benefits from wildlife for villagers, this aspect being unsuccessful – though their training and capacity supports to communities continues to makes a valuable contribution. Later the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project was mooted, attempting on a far grander scale what ADMADE had attempted. It too proved unsuccessful.
The Zambian leadership (though not the legislation and policy) is ambivalent both in its attempts to devolve power from the centre to the regions – in particular to land under the customary authority, and to attract investment, wary of being swamped by aggressive outsiders whom they believe will capture the opportunities for wealth creation. Zambia therefore resists de-centralization and remains dependent on donor aid which creates few jobs, does not generate sustainable development, perpetuates Zambia’s debt dependency, weakens its ability to fend for itself and hinders it from becoming truly independent.
However, Zambia, under current laws, provides opportunities for investors to enter into joint ventures with customary authorities and district councils. The 1995 Lands Act created the opportunity for individuals with rights of usage and occupation of land under customary law to obtain leasehold rights of 99 years within open areas – and with the permission of ZAWA, in GMAs. This attracted a certain level of investment and one-off payments to Chiefs, particularly from the sale of lodge sites and land for game ranches, resulting in some cases, in the permanent alienation of the land and the removal of any possible sustained income for communities. While posing dangers of land alienation, the Lands Act does support the devolution of power to communities. In addition, there are two important Acts supporting the empowerment of communities, the Wildlife Act of 1998, which prescribes the election of Community Resource Boards (CRBs) with the chief as patron and which advances as one of its main missions: ‘to facilitate the active participation of local communities in the management of the wildlife estate’, and the Forestry Act No. 7 of 1999, which though yet to be enacted is already advancing its de-centralization and community ownership provisions. However, very little investment has found its way into rural areas because the usual purpose of investors is to obtain large areas of land on leasehold, something to which Africa as a whole is united in rejecting. In order to avoid such a pitfall, it is necessary to have a development model available which does not alienate land, and which encourages investment in the sustained use of the natural resources and the improvement in the livelihoods of local communities.
At present, virtually the only income received by customary areas – and then only in wildlife rich areas, is from safari concessions, though the amounts are paltry when considering that communities must shoulder the cost of protecting their areas as part of the bargain. And despite legislation and policy affirming the rights of customary authorities and CRBs, and despite its ratification of international and Pan-African conventions, Government resists moves by chiefdoms and investors to make more holistic use of the hunting concessions - which fall under the authority.
What is required is a shift away from one-dimensional safari hunting concessions, and its replacement in selected areas by a conservancy system of integrated conservation and development programmes that will ensure the continued level of earnings for ZAWA, the capacity support to CRBs, the non-alienation of land from the chiefdoms, enabling chiefdoms and the flagging District Councils to engage with investors and nurture the overdue raising of community livelihoods and, crucially, bring investors a sustained return.